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Abstract— Based on the complex grid infrastructure of the 
Ilmenau Interactive Hybrid Online Lab various possibilities 
of occurrence of malfunctions as well as mechanisms to 
avoid them will be discussed. This will be demonstrated by 
different examples. One implementation challenge is to 
protect the physical systems in the lab against wrong control 
algorithms or malicious trying to sabotage or to destroy the 
system - without defining too many design constraints. 
Therefore, a high level of safety must be guaranteed for 
such an autonomous working system. Therefore the first 
step is the verification of sensor and actuator constellations 
to guarantee safety in online labs. Based upon this an 
efficient possibility for a validation of the student’s design 
will be shown as subsequent step. 
Keywords— control engineering education; laboratories; 
Web-based education; virtual and remote labs; Web-based 
design tools; distance learning. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Integrated Communication Systems Group at the 
Ilmenau University of Technology is an expert in the field 
of Internet-supported teaching of digital system design 
and is well experienced in the area of integrated hard- and 
software systems for over 10 years. The students have to 
pass hands-on examinations in a lab to complete the 
learning outcomes by own experiences. For all students, 
hands-on experiences are important to deepen their 
knowledge about topics they learned during lectures. With 
our interactive hybrid online lab, called GOLDi (Grid of 
Online Lab Devices Ilmenau), we want to offer the 
students a working environment that is as close as 
possible to a real world laboratory. Under real laboratory 
conditions disturbances can appear and lead to failures of 
the control algorithm that cannot be detected under virtual 
lab conditions. Facilities of hybrid online labs provide 
permanent online access for students and supervisors, and 
give possibilities to check different parts of the designs 
most easily. Besides the advantages for students, this also 
reduces the costs for academic teaching and improves the 
overall quality by offering more practical training options. 
This gives students the chance to realize correct 
designs, to organize self-study process of the student more 
efficiently, to control student’s work and to broaden the 
ways of communication in research work with companies 
as well. This solution is intended 
for the use in teaching materials dealing with the 
design of digital control systems and embedded 
systems – from the basics up to complex design 
tasks as well as 
within the newly established Tempus projects “ICo-op – 
Industrial Cooperation and Creative Engineering 
Education based on Remote Engineering and Virtual 
Instrumentation” [1] and “DesIRE – Development of 
Embedded System courses with implementation of 
Innovative virtual approaches for integration of 
Education, Research and Production in UA, GE, AM”  
[2]. 
The detailed concept, including the possibilities and 
limitations of such an approach, as well as the 
infrastructure and many different fields of applications of 
the Ilmenau Interactive Hybrid Online Lab GOLDi (see 
Fig. 1) were presented in previous papers [3, 4, 5, 6]. 
 
Figure 1.  Overview of the Ilmenau Interactive Hybrid Online Lab 
GOLDi 
II. SECURITY AND SAFETY IN ONLINE LABS 
One implementation challenge is to protect the physical 
systems (the electro-mechanical hardware model, e.g. 
elevator, water-level control, high-storage warehouse, 3-
axis portal) in the lab against 
wrong control algorithms of unskilled students or 
malicious trying to sabotage or to destroy the system 
without defining too many design constraints. Therefore, a 
high level of safety must be guaranteed for such an 
autonomous working system. 
Generally two types of “security/safety” must be 
considered for systems with access to the Internet – like 
our online labs: 
(1) Information Security (security) 
defines procedures and requirements concerning the 
protection of information processing as well as some 
policies to avoid unauthorized data manipulations [7] 
– see Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2.  Information Security in Online Labs 
This topic concerns first and foremost the remote lab 
server as well as the experiment booking system but 
should not be the focus of this article. 
(2) Operational safety (safety) 
defines functional safety of electrical, electronic, 
programmable electronic safety-related systems. It 
defines several safety integrity level (SIL) 
requirements for any  
 
Figure 3.  Operational Safety in Online Labs 
safety function and provides a risk-based conceptual 
framework [8] – see Fig. 3. 
There are different protection strategies already existing 
in the industry; however, they are designed for a specific 
application and require special software or they impose 
design constraints. More flexibility is required for online 
labs with constantly changing tasks, especially when 
students are free in their design decisions and should be 
encouraged to develop their own creative solutions for a 
given task / problem. 
To guarantee the safety within the GOLDi 
infrastructure two main components are necessary (see 
Fig. 1) 
the bus protection unit (BPU) to interface various control 
units where the students design task is running on (e.g. 
FPGA, Microcontroller, PLC, …) to the internal remote 
lab bus and to protect it from misuse and damage as well 
as 
the physical system protection unit (PSPU), which 
protects the physical systems against deliberate damage or 
accidentally wrong control commands and which offers 
different access and control mechanisms. 
The bus protection unit receives commands from a 
control unit and simply checks them for bus validity. This 
is done by using the specific GOLDi transmission 
protocol [9]. The content of the transmitted data and 
addresses are not checked, because this depends on the 
selected physical system and is therefore done by the 
specific protection units of each physical system. The 
function of the bus protection unit is to prevent a control 
unit from blocking the bus and causing others to be 
affected. The bus protection unit is based on the same 
hardware as the protection units for the physical hardware 
models in the remote lab but uses different add-on boards 
and a different firmware. This simplifies production and 
maintenance. 
The physical system protection unit is necessary when 
students execute their algorithms on the selected control 
unit and want to be completely free in their choice of 
design tools. All protection mechanisms discussed within 
this paper are executed inside an FPGA on this PSPU. 
Compared to the approach used so far, there was no 
possibility to check, if the executed commands are safe for 
the physical system. This means, damage could be caused 
by invalid commands. The first task of the protection unit 
(the verification process) is to check for command safety 
by filtering all commands. Only commands that will not 
cause any malfunction will be transferred to the physical 
system. All others are discarded. A validation as second 
step can be used as indicator for the quality of the students 
design. The feedbacks from the verification and validation 
module will be reported to a learning management system 
(LMS) to give the student immediately information about 
the occurrence of a fault and inform him about the quality 
of the realized design task – see Fig. 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Observation of the student’s design – optionally under LMS 
control 
Using such universal protection units gives the students 
the largest degree of freedom for their design, because no 
precautions have to be taken into account. Therefore, no 
additional security framework (workbench) within the 
software and hardware control design is required to 
prevent malfunctions of the physical system. The 
complete design flow is carried out at the students’ side, 
giving them a more authentic look at a real world project 
design flow. 
A normal faultless communication during a running 
experiment is shown in Figure 5. . The physical system 
(e.g. an elevator) generates different sensor signals 
(xsensor). Based on these sensor input signals the control 
unit generates the corresponding actuator output signals 
(yactuator) according the implemented student’s control 
algorithm [10]. 
 
Figure 5.  Faultless communication during a running experiment 
Figure 6.  shows an example for a sequence diagram for 
a 3-floor elevator which drives upwards from the 2nd floor 
with destination floor no. 3. The sensor signal x1 [cabin 
position 2nd floor] signalizes that the cabin is still in floor 
no. 2. This signal will be transmitted via the PSPU and the 
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BPU to the connected control unit. Thereupon the control 
unit will activate the actuator signal y0 [drive upwards] 
which will be transmitted via the BPU and the PSPU back 
to the physical system to finally move the cabin upwards.  
 
Figure 6.  Sequence Diagram example: “move upwards and stop at 3rd 
floor” 
If the cabin reaches the 3rd floor sensor signal x2 [cabin 
position 3th floor] will be activated and the whole 
communication cycle starts again – the control unit will 
now deactivate the actuator signal y0 to stop the cabin 
motion. 
In both directions the PSPU checks the signals on 
validity – only correct actuator signals will be transferred 
to the physical system. The detailed verification and 
validation concept will be described in the next sections. 
III. OPERATIONAL SAFETY THROUGH VERIFICATION 
A verification of the control signals is used to guarantee 
the operational safety of the remote lab infrastructure. It 
means the electromechanical hardware models (physical 
system) must be protected against destruction. 
Malfunctions in the control can have multiple causes. 
They are defined as control signals (actuator signals), 
which cause a damaging or destruction of the physical 
system according the actual status of the input signals 
(sensor signals). 
For online labs we have to distinguish between two 
causes of faults: on the one hand faults caused by the user 
(“user-based faults”) as well as faults due to the remote 
lab infrastructure and the communication within this 
infrastructure on the other hand (“infrastructure-based 
faults”). The whole fault diagnosis and handling will be 
managed through the PSPU by an FPGA. In any case the 
user must receive information on the occurrence of the 
fault. Additionally these faults will be logged to give 
feedback to a connected LMS or to the responsible tutor. 
These two types of faults as well as the error detection 
mechanisms will be described in the following. 
A. User-based Faults 
These faults are caused by the users e.g. by wrong 
control algorithms or malicious trying to sabotage or to 
destroy the system. Figure 7.  shows an example for a 
faulty elevator control algorithm. The cabin is already 
located on the top (3rd) floor. After receiving the 
corresponding sensor signal (x2 [cabin position 3rd floor]) 
the student’s control algorithm still generates the wrong 
actuator signal (y0 [move cabin upwards]) to drive 
upwards. In this case the PSPU must  
reject this actuator signal,  
stop the cabin, 
give the student a feedback about his mistake and 
optionally inform the connected LMS about the situation. 
 
Figure 7.  Example for an user-related fault 
B. Infrastructure-based Faults 
The GOLDi infrastructure itself and the communication 
between all remote lab components can also cause fault 
situations. 
1) Invalid sensor value constellation 
 
The simplest case is a faulty electrical connection 
between a sensor and the PSPU or a defective sensor. This 
leads to invalid sensor values. Figure 8.  gives an example 
for two simultaneously active sensor signals in the 2nd 
floor (x1 [cabin position 2nd floor]) as well as in the 3rd 
floor (x02 [cabin position 3rd floor]). The PSPU detects 
this situation and stops all actuator signals which will 
bring the physical system in a fail-save state. The user will 
be informed about the situation by an error message and a 
continuation of the experiment is only possible after 
solving the problem. 
 
Figure 8.  Example for invalide sensor constellation detection 
Furthermore it is not so easy to detect a defective 
sensor which generates no sensor signal. Only such floor 
sensors can be detected if there are additional sensors 
above and below. Defective floor sensors in the lowest 
and highest floor cannot be detected. 
2) Infrastructure-based delay (without timeout) 
 
The quality of the Internet connection speed leads to a 
more or less large time delay between the activated sensor 
signal (e.g. x2 in Figure 9. Figure 4. Figure 3. ) and the 
calculated corresponding actuator signal (e.g. y0 in Figure 
9. Figure 3. ). Especially if the selected control unit for 
this experiment is not located in the remote lab, but 
outside on the student’s client PC or a tablet. 
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Figure 9.  Infrastructure-based delay (without timeout) 
This means that the cabin moves continuously upward 
for a certain time !!!(see Figure 9. ) and could damage 
the physical system. That’s why the PSPU must stop the 
cabin motion immediately after !!!. According to the 
internal PSPU architecture this takes only a few 
nanoseconds. This means the physical system is in a fail-
safe state temporarily. This is the same effect as the above 
described invalid sensor value constellation detection. But 
in this case the PSPU will wait for a response of the 
control unit for a certain time !!!. Normally the control 
unit detects the situation (activated sensor x02) and reacts 
within !!! with the corresponding actuator signal 
(deactivated y0) to stop the motion. If this response time 
!!! is within the range of the given time slot !!!, the 
PSPU will not generate any error messages. Figure 9.  
demonstrates this effect. This time slot !!! is adjustable – 
for the GOLDi infrastructure it is defined with 2 seconds. 
 
3) Infrastructure-based error (timeout) 
 
The just described situation assumes that the control 
unit will generate an actuator signal (as the result of any 
sensor changing) within a defined time slot !!!. 
If the reaction time !!! is greater than the specified 
time slot !!!; the PSPU must generate a timeout and 
cancel the experiment to bring the physical system in a 
stable state (see Figure 10. ). The user will be informed 
about this. In general it makes no sense to continue the 
experiment if the Internet speed is too slow. 
A timeout will also be generated if something goes 
wrong within the control unit e.g. the control unit doesn’t 
send actuator signals anymore.  
C. Error Detection Mechanisms 
After the description of possible faulty situations during 
a running experiment (user-based, infrastructure-based) 
the mechanism for the detection of these errors will be 
described in the following. 
As mentioned before the whole fault diagnosis and 
handling will be managed through the PSPU by an FPGA. 
Thereby three modules within the PSPU have to analyze 
 
 
Figure 10.  Infrastructure-based error (timeout) 
(1) sensor input signal (xsensor) constellations 
This module monitors the sensor signals of the 
physical system and detects forbidden 
constellations; for instance simultaneous 
activation of sensor x1 [cabin position 2nd floor] 
and sensor x2 [cabin position 3rd floor]. 
(2) actuator output signals (yactuator) constellations 
This module monitors the actuator signals of the 
physical system and detects forbidden 
constellations; for instance it is not allowed to 
open the cabin doors (activated y7 [open cabin 
door at 3rd floor] while driving upwards 
(activated y0 [move upwards]). 
(3) constellations of sensor and actuator signals 
This module monitors the sensor and actuator 
signals of the physical system and detects 
forbidden constellations; for instance it is not 
allowed to move the cabin upwards (activated y0 
[move upwards]) as long as the door in the 2nd 
floor is open (activated x11 [door 2nd floor is 
open]). 
Because the error handling will be done by an FPGA, 
all three modules can be executed in parallel. If one of the 
modules detects an error, a corresponding error code will 
be generated and transferred to the main experiment flow 
control module (see Figure 11. ). This flow control 
module finally decides whether an intervention in the 
ongoing experiment is necessary. 
 
Figure 11.  Error Detection Mechanism 
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Heart of each of these three diagnosis modules is a 
simple matrix structure to register all possible forbidden 
constellations. Figure 12.  gives an impression for such a 
matrix for the third module (sensor/actuator 
constellations). 
 
Figure 12.  Matrix for the Sensor/Actuator Diagnosis module 
Let’s consider the following constellation exemplarily. 
The actuator signal y0 = 1 (highlighted line in Figure 12. ) 
of the physical system could be activated by the main 
experiment flow control module only if: 
the actuator signal y0 generated by the control unit is 
activated and  
the cabin is not already in the 3rd floor (x2 = 0) and 
all doors in the three floors must be closed (x8=1, x10=1, 
x12=1) and 
the overload and the emergency stop indicators must be 
deactivated (x24=0, x25=0). 
This means that all functionality of the error detection 
can be reduced to combinational equations implemented 
in VHDL on the FPGA of the PSPU, e.g. for the described 
situation: 
!!
! !!! !"#$%"&!!"#$ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!"!!!!"!!!!!" 
IV. EVALUATION THROUGH VALIDATION 
In addition to the verification of the students design 
necessary to guarantee the safety inside the online lab 
(described in the previous section), users want to have a 
fast feedback to their realized control task. Therefore, 
possibilities for an automatic validation of the user’s 
solutions within the GOLDi infrastructure were 
implemented as well (see Figure 4. ). Thus, an assessment 
of the quality of the developed solution can be given 
immediately. Therefore a reference design and a method 
to check the students’ design against this reference are 
needed. The reference design should be independent of 
the used control unit and the development tools and only 
specifies certain objectives of the given task. 
It is the main advantage of this verification that only 
valid sensor/actuator constellations (passed through the 
verification module) will serve as inputs for the reference 
automaton. Eventually these are not efficient according 
the given task; but they will not cause any faulty problems 
on the physical system. Both changes in sensor signals as 
well as changes in actuator signals will act as “events” to 
trigger the reference automaton (one event = one 
automaton execution step). 
To evaluate the students design, the given task will be 
divided into several subtasks. The most efficient path 
through the automaton graph (best quality of the realized 
design) is a vertical processing from state to state. If there 
are any deviations from the ideal design, each subtask 
contains several “co-states” where the tutor can define a 
“weight” for this deviation. Strong deviations from the 
ideal design mean large weights; little deviations mean 
small weights. For the overall quality of the students 
design it finally means: the lower the earned deviation 
weight points the better the design! The design of the 
reference automaton with the possibility to allow several 
deviations of the optimal design in each subtask and the 
specification of the weights for a certain deviation is a 
very ambitious task for the tutor and requires a lot of 
experience. That’s why only an extract of a very simple 
design task will be used to illustrate the validation 
mechanism. 
 
Figure 13.  Example for a reference design automaton graph (excerpt) 
Figure 13.  shows an extract of an automaton graph for 
a reference design of the following task: “Move the 
elevator as quick as possible from the 1st floor to the 3rd 
floor – without any stop or opening of the doors. Stop at 
the 3rd floor and then open the doors”. 
The reference design for this simple task can be divided 
into several subtasks. The first subtask “move cabin to 1st 
floor” is fulfilled, when sensor x0 … cabin position 1st 
floor is activated. For the next subtask (main state) “move 
cabin to the 3rd floor” the following two deviations (co-
states) are allowable: “stop cabin motion” (with a 
weighting of 2) and “move cabin downward” (with a 
weighting of 6 – because this means a stronger deviation 
from the given task). This subtask can be fulfilled from 
any of these three states (main state or the two co-states) 
by activating the sensor signal x2 … cabin position 3rd 
floor. 
 
 Actual state Event Next state weight 
(1) Move to 3rd floor !!!!!!!!! Stop motion 2 
 Stop motion !!!!!!!! Move to 3
rd floor 0 
   Earned weights: 2 
(2) Move to 3rd floor !!!!! Move downward 6 
 Move downward !!!!!!!! Move to 3
rd floor 0 
   Earned weights: 6 
(3) Move to 3rd floor !!!!!!!!! Stop motion 2 
 Stop motion !!!!! Move downward 6 
 Move downward !!!!!!!!! Stop motion 2 
 Stop motion !!!!!!!! Move to 3
rd floor 0 
   Earned weights: 10 
Figure 14.  Matrix for the Sensor/Actuator Diagnosis module 
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Starting from the main state (see Figure 13. ), the 
following three sequences will give an impression how to 
calculate the overall weighting for the actually performed 
design task – with derivations from the ideal design: 
1. The motion starts upwards according the given task. 
But now the motion will be stopped. After continuing 
motion upwards the task will be fulfilled by reaching 
the 3rd floor. The student will earn in sum 2 
derivation points. 
2. The motion starts upwards according the given task. 
But now the motion will change to downward. A 
strong derivation! After continuing motion upwards 
the task will be fulfilled by reaching the 3rd floor. 
The student will earn in sum 6 derivation points. 
3. The motion starts upwards according the given task. 
Now the motion will be stopped. After that the 
motion will change to downward and stops again. 
Finally after continuing motion upwards the task will 
be fulfilled by reaching the 3rd floor. The student will 
earn in sum 10 derivation points. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Main focus of this paper is a complex verification 
system to protect the electromechanical hardware models 
(physical systems) in a remote lab against wrong control 
algorithms of (unskilled) students or malicious trying to 
sabotage or to destroy the system – without defining too 
many design constraints. For online labs we have to 
distinguish between two causes of faults: faults caused by 
the user (“user-based faults”) as well as faults due to the 
remote lab infrastructure and the communication within 
this infrastructure on the other hand (“infrastructure-
based faults”). This task will be executed within the 
physical system protection unit (PSPU) by filtering all 
commands. Only commands that will not cause any 
malfunction will be transferred to the physical system.  
In addition, users want to have a fast feedback to their 
realized solutions. Therefore, possibilities for an 
automatic validation of the user’s design within the 
GOLDi infrastructure were implemented as well. Thus, an 
assessment of the quality of the developed solution can be 
given immediately. For an efficient usage of the validation 
system, the reference design and a method to check the 
student’s design against this reference design step by step 
will be traced by a learning management system (LMS) 
like “moodle” to analyze any experimental results of the 
user and generates feedback to improve the given design.  
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